ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.

The defendant W. B. Shute having removed the suit, what was
the effect of such removal upon the other defendants ?
The language of the act is, "may remove said suit." The suit
in this case is against.the defendants jointly, and is an entirety, a
single cause of' action, and if the suit be removed, no part of it
remains in the court from whence the removal was made; but a
subsequent section of the act, after providing for the steps which
must be taken by any one of the defendants entitled to remove the
suit, to wit, the filing of the petition, and bond, says, "it shall be
the duty of the state court to accept said petition and bond, and
proceed no further in such suit," the suit having been removed to
the Circuit Court. Such court obtains full jurisdiction of the entire
subject-matter, and of all the parties thereto, and can fully determine the controversy between all the parties to the suit; to give
the construction contended for by the plaintiff would divide the
suit, placing a part of it to be tried in one court, subject to its
rulings and decisions in the trial, and a part of it in another court,
whose rulings and decisions might be entirely at variance, and increasing greatly the costs and expenses of the litigation ; this would
ie contrary to judicial policy, and such a construction as could not
have been contemplated by the- makers of the law. In the judgment of the court, therefore, the entire suit was upon the petition
of defendant Shute removed into this court, and it was not necessary
to such removal that the other defendants should. have joined in the
petition for removal. The motion to. remand is therefore overruled.
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a bank against endorsers of a note discounted fir the accommodation of
the drawer, the affidavit of'defcncec was that '-at and before tile time
that defcnlants endorsed the note," they inquired of the cashier and
one of* the directors of the bank whether it would be safe for them to
endorsc, and that these officers infiormed them that they considered the
drawer perfectly good, and that they would be safe in endorsing; that the
officers knew the representations to be filse, and that they made them to
deceive defendants ; that defendants would not have endorsed but for
the representations. Kehl to be insufficient: Maes v. Second Nat.
Bank of 7itusille, 80 Penna.
Such declarations, although wilfully false, made by the officers, not

in the course of their duties as officers, or agents of the bank, could not
affect the bank: Id.

ALLUVION.

See J'faters and 11hatercourzes.
ARBITRATION.

Essentials of Award-lfatters submtted.-It is essential to the
validity of an award, that the arbitrator award upon all the subjects
embraced in the submission that are heard by hiiii, and upon which his
judgment is required; but, where the submission, in terms, compre.
bends all matters in difference, it is competent for the parties on the
hearing, to submit to the arbitrator just such matters as they elect, and
his award upon such matters is conclusive : loung v. Kinney, 48 Vt.
Every reasonable intendment is to be made in favor of an award ; and
in order to impeach an award on the ground that part only of the matters
submitted was awarded upon, it must be distinctly shown that the
matters not awarded upon were so brought to the notice of the arbitrator
that it became his duty to hear and determine them : .Td.
Aicard must be inanimous,unless otherwise provided in the submission
-Effiet of a dissension among Arbitrators-- here matters of dispute
arq submitted to arbitration, the award to be binding must be concurred
in by all of the arbitrators, unless it be otherwise provided in the submission: Iarrinman v. Jlarrnman,43 Md.
Where, f'ron a dissension among arbitrators, the award fails, the reference is at an end unless renewed by agreement of the parties, and the
eourt has no power, unless given by statute or the agreement of the
parties, to appoint new arbitrators; and ordinarily it has no power to
refer the matter back to the same arbitrators, after setting aside their
award, unless such power be one of the terms of the submission : I.
A clause in a submission to arbitrators providing that "in the event
of either of the parties disputing the validity of the award, or moving
the court to set it, or any part of it, aside, the court shall have power
to remit the matters referred, or any of them, to the reconsideration and
determination of the arbitrators making such award," is unavailing,
where the arbitrators do not agree, as it would be utterly futile to remit
the matters of reference to the same arbitrators, when it is apparent
that they do not agree and that the reference must ultimately fail: .1d.
AssuMPSIT. See Deed.
Officers of Corporation not entitled to Compensation.-Thcre is no
implied assumpsit that the president and directors of a railway company,
occupying the position of trustees of the funds and property of the
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company, shall be entitled to any compensation for their ordinary servi'cws as such officers, unless the salary is fixed by thc by-laws or a resolution of the board, before the services are performed : (ridl
v. L.
B. & M1..Railway Co., 71 Ill.
Damages for lrice of Gdods sold under Sp~ecial Contract-No principle involved in the action of assumpsit is sustained by a greater ftor3e
of authority, than that where there has been a special contract, the whole
of which has been executed on the part of the plaintiff, and the time of
payment oil the other side has passed, a suit may either be brought on
the special contract, or a general assumpsit may be maintained; and in
the latter case the measure of damages will be the rate of recompense
fixed by the special contract: Applernan v. MAichael, 43 Md.
ATTORNEY.

See Judgment.

Statute of Limitations-Recorc for Services by Attorne .- An
attorney's employment in a suit is continuous, and the Statute of Limitations does not begin to run upon his charges therein till the suit is
ended, or his employment otherwise terminated: Davis v. Smith, 48
Vt.
.While plaintiff was defendant's solicitor in prosecuting a foreclosure
suit against P., he purchased P.'s equity of redemption in the premises
for his own benefit, and brought a bill to redeem against defbndhnrt,
wherein it was decided that inasmuch as plaintiff was defendant's solicitor at the time of the purchase, defendant was entitled to the benefit
thereof. " Held, that plaintiff.was, nevertheless, entitled to recover for
services rendered in the foreclosure suit prior to his purchase, but not
for services in making the purchase : Id.
BANK.
BANKRUPTCY.

See Agent.

Sce Courts; Landlord and Tenant.
BILLS AND NOTES.

Givenfor Patent Right.-A negotiable promissory note given for a
patent right wthout the words, "given for a patent right," inserted
therein as required by No. 68, sect. 2, of Acts of 1870, is good in the
hands of a bonafide holder for value, who takes it before maturity and
without notice of what it was given for : Pendar v. Kelley, 48 Vt.
Warranty of Genuineness.-It is a general if not uniform rule that a
person passing bank bills, or commercial paper, or making sale of a chose
in action, guarantees or warrants the genuineness of the instrument, and
this whether he does so in terms. or is silent when the transfe- is made
Tyler v. Bailey, 71 Ill.
Fraudand Circumvention.-Although the execution of a promissory
note may be procured as to a surety by the fraud of the principal maker,
if the payee is an innocent party, and has no knowledge of the facts,
and is not privy to the fraud, this will afford no defence against the
note : Anderson v. Warne, 71 Ill.
CHATTEL

IORTGAGE.

Pledge of personal Property as Seeurty-Equitj of Redemption.-A
bill of sale whereby a debtor conveys personal property to his creditor
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as see,it,, and which provides that the property slall remain in the
debtor's possession, and he have thirty days to redeem by paying the
debt. iS a nilrtgage . 13iodyett v. Blodyr'tt, 48 Vt.
A nmorgagor of personal property, after condition broken, has an
equity of redenption that may be asserted if lie brings his bill to redeem
within a reasonable time : i.
A tenldr of the amount of the debt after the law day has passed, unaccepted, does not divest the mortgagee of his legal title to the property
mortgaged ; and chancery has jurisdiction to decree redemption . M.
When the mortgagee disposes of the property after tender made and
before final hearing, so that an order for its redelivery cannot be made,
a decree may be entered for the amount of the mortgagor's interest
therein : Id.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
Re qilt;on of Commrrce-.Agreement between States before the adoption ,!" the (Ubnstittio.-The.comnpact between South Carolina and
Georgia made in 1787, by which it was agreed that the boundary between the two states should be tie northern branch or stream of the
Savannah river, and that the navigation of the river along a specified
channel should for ever be equally free to the citizens of both states,
and exempt froin hindrance, interruption or molestation attempted to
be enfhrced by one state on the citizens of another, has no effect upon
the subsequent constitutional provision that Congress shall have power

to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states:
State of South Carolina v. State of Georgia, Al!)honso Taft, Secretary
of l'€ar of the 5ited States et al., S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1876.
Congress has the same power over the Savannah river that it has
over the other navigable waters of the United States: d.
The right to regulate commerce includes the right to regulate navigation. and hence to regulate and improve navigable rivers and ports on
such rivers, and for this purpose to close one of several channels in a
navigable stream, if, in its judgment, thereby the miavigation of the
river will be improved. It may declare that an actual obstruction is
not, in the view of the law, an illegal one: d.
An appropriation for the improvement of a harbor on a navigable
river "to be expended under the direction of the secretary of war,"
confers upon that officer the discretion to determine the mode of improvement, and authorizes his diversion of the water from one channel
into another, if, in his judgment, such is the best. mode : Mi.
Such a diversion is not giving preference to the ports of one state
over those of another: Id.
Qicxre : Whether a state suing for the prevention of a nuisance in a
navigable river, which is one of its boundaries, must not aver and show
that she sustains some special and peculiar injury thereby, such as
would enable a private person to maintain a similar action : id.
CONTRACT

For future delivery as (istinguished from 'llager.-A contract for the
sale and purchase of wheat to be delivered in good faith at a future time
is not void as a "wagering contract," but when under such an agreement
it is understood by the parties that no wheat is to be delivered, but only
d:payment at the time appointed of the difference between the contract
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and the market price, it thus becomes a wagering contract and the law
will not enfiorccit: Rnmsey v. Berry, 65 Ae.
The plaintiffs in good faith at the request and for the benefit of the
defendant made an agreement for the sale of wheat to be delivered
within a certain time at the option of the defendant, he to furnish sufficient " margin" to secure them against loss. The defendant failed to
comply with his part of the contract, and a loss ensued. 1Held, that
under .4uch a contract the law will give to the plaintiffs a remedy for
their loss: Li.
CORPORATION.

See Assumpsit.

Agreement to take Shares.-A written agreenient to take and secure a
certain number of shares in an insurance company before its organization is a proposal to take that number of shares, and does not make the
subscribers thereto stockholders in such company, unless such proposal
has been accepted by said company after it has been organized: Starratt v. Rockland Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 65 Me.
The return or the name of such a subscriber to the secretary of state,
as a stockholder, by the secretary of the company, under a mistake of
ihct, and the entry of it upon the stock ledger, do not constitute an
acceptance of his proposal: Id.
Such acts of the secretary are open to explanation and control by
parol proof that they were committed under a mistake of fihct in respect
to any particular person whose name has been thus returned and entered : Id.
COUNTIES.

-hotliablefor NAeylience.-Thc general rule of law, that the superior
or employer must answer civilly for the negligence or want of skill of
his ageut or servant in the course or line of his employment, by which
another is injured, does not apply to counties. They stand on a differet footing, in this respect, from individuals and private corporations,
and from municipal corporations proper, such as cities and towns, acting
under charters or incorporating statutes: Symonds v. Clay Co., 71 Ill.
COURTS.

.Bankruptcy nrisdlction of State Courts under United States Laws.
-Under the Bankrupt Act of 1867 the assignee might sue in the state
courts to recover the assets of the bankrupt, no exclusive jurisdiction
being given to the courts of the United States. Whether such exclusive jurisdiction is given by the Revised Statutes, umre : Claflin v.
Houseman, Assignee, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1876.
The laws of the United States are as much the law of the land in
any state as state laws are; and although, in their enforcement, exclusive jurisdiction may be given to the Federal courts, yet where such exclusive jurisdiction is not. given, or necessarily implied, the state courts,
having competent jurisdiction in other respects, may be resorted to:
Id.
In such eases, the state courts do not exercise a new jurisdiction confcrr~d upon them, but their ordinary jurisdiction derived from their constitution under the state laws : 1L
COVENANT.

Foifeiture-Eqity-Time.-Bradyleased to Lambing a lot of land;
to have the sole right to bore for oil, &c., for twenty yeais, Lamfing tp
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commence operations in sixty days and continue with due diligence ; if'
ally one ti me. Brady mlight
he should cease operations twenty days 1i11r
resume possession. There were other covenants in the lease. and it was
then stipulated thaL a fiilure of Lanbing to comply with any one of the
conditions should work a forfeiture, and Brady might enter and dispose
of the premises as if the lease had not been made. It was flurtlher agreed
that if Lambing did not commence operations at the time specified. lie
should pay Brady 630 per month until he should commence : Ilhl d. that
the covenant of forfeiture was modified. not abrogated, by the clause for
payment of rent: Brown v. J,ndcqrit?, 80 Penna.
Lambing did not commence operations; he paid four months' rent;
he omitted payment for eleven months and then tendered the amount
for that time : Jfeh, that the lessor might refuse the tender and insist
on the forfeiture. In such case time is of the essence of the contract,
and equity follows the law and will enforce the covenant of foribiture
as essential to do justice : 1d.
Equity abhors a forfeiture when it works a loss that is contrary to
equity, not when it works equity and protects the lessor against the
laches of the lessee : lN.
DAMAGES.

See Assumpsit.

Conthnthg .i dsance or Trespass.-The measure of damages for a continuing nuisance, or a continuing trespa-s, for which succe-sive actions
may be maintained till the wrongdoer is compelled to remove the nuisance or discnti,,ue the trespass, is the loss sustained at the date of the
plaintiff's writ and fbr which a recovery has not already been had, and
not the diminution in the value of the estate : Cumberland and Oxford
Canal Co. v. Ilitchings, 65 Me.
When one wrongfully places an obstruction upon the land of another,
he is under a legal obligation to remove it, and successive actions may
be maintained until he is compelled to remove it. : Id.
The filling up of a canal wrongfully is a trespass for which successive
actions may be maintained till the obstruction is removed : .d.
See Waters and l1-atercourses.
DEED.
Acknowledgment of Considerationnot an Estoppel-Assunpsit.-The
acknowledgment by the grantor of the receipt of the consideration of a
deed is not a conclusive estoppel that it has been so received : Barterv.
Greenleaf, 65 Me.
When a promise of payment or some other contract or thing to be
done has been relied upon as tme consideration of a deed and the grantee
refuses to pay or perform, the grantor may recover the value of his property as upon an implied assumpsit: Il.
EIMINENT D0M3AIN.

e.-Province of JdAiciary.-Courts have the right to deterPnublfic
mine whether the use of private property proposed to be taken and appropriated to, is public in its nature or not; but when the use is public,
the judiciary cannot inquire into the necessity or propriety of exercising
the right of eminent domain; that right is political in its nature and to
determine when it -hall be exercised belongs excl-ively to the legislative branch of the government : C., ie. 0. & 1-.Railroad Co. v. Town
of Lake, 71 Ill.
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EQUITY.
.1fake.-A mistake of fact to warrant a court of equity in granting
relief must be niaierial, and such as controlled the action of the party.
It will not suffice if it be merely incidental nor the result of negligence,
nor will the party be permitted to sleep on his discovery of it: Grymes
v. Sanders, Adm'r, et al., S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1876.
ERRORS AND APPEALS.
here an appellant obtains
_Practicc-Parties-Estolpel-zvier.-W
an order of severance in the court below, and does not make parties to
his appeal some who were parties below, and who are interested in
maintaining the decree, he cannot ask its reversal here on any matter
which will injuriously affect their interests: Terry v. Merchants' and
Planters' Bank, S. 0. U. S., Oct. Term 1876.
When an appellant seeks to reverse a decree because too large an
allowance was made to appellees out of a fund in which he and they
were both interested, he will not be permitted to do so when he has received allowances of the same kind, and has otherwise waived his right
to make the specific objection raised for the first time here: Id.
ESTOPPEL.

See Errors and Appeals.

EXECUTOR.

See Legacy.

Plea of plenc administravt-Judgmentde bonus propris.-In an
action of debt against an executor founded on a judgment against his
testator in his Ilfetime, where there is a plea of plenc administravitand
no averment of derastavit in the varr, the judgment should be de bonis
testatoris,and a judgment dle bonis propriis will be reversed: Smith v.
Chapman, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1876.
Where the jury find against an executor on a plea of plene administravit, they must find the amount of assets in his hands before judgment
can be entered against him: Id.
FORFEITURE.

See Covenant.

FORMER ADJUDICATION.
Assault and Battery.-In trespass for assault and battery, the defendant gave notice that he sued the plaintiff for the identical assault
and battery declared upon, and recovered judgment against him, which
he paid. Held, no bar: Cade v. M fcFarland,48 Vt.
FRAUDS, STATUTE OF.

.Effect of full Payment.-Full payment of the purcbase-money for
real estate verbally agreed to be conveyed is not of itself sufficient to
take the agreement out of the Statute of' Frauds. There must also be
possession taken of the property: Temple v. Johnson, 71 Ill.
GUARDIAN.

Profit out of Ward's Estate-Rusband aud Wife-H---usband's Creditors.-A guardian had money of his ward; he placed it in his wife's
hands at the instance of his surety to preserve it from his creditors and
his own control ; she invested it in real estate, and by various transactions realized profit, with which she purchased the property that was
VOL. XXV.--8
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levied on under an execution for a debt of the husband. Tid, that. the
money with its profits belonged to the ward, and the accretions could
not be seized as the husband's: Kelpler v. JDtir, SO Penna.
Trustees cannot derive advantage from the administration of the trust
property: JL
Profit derived from land purchased by a trustee with trust money
shall go for the benefit of the cestii que trust: l.
The ownership of a trust fund is unaffected by the change of the custodian, or where it is taken by a volunteer, or one who has notice of the
trust: l.
Other moneys came into the wife's hands from the minor sons of the
husband, who had relinquished their earnings ; the husband took no
part in the transactions of the wife: Held, that the creditors of the husband could not be benefited by her profit from these moneys: I.
IIUS13AND AND 'WIFE.

S~e Guardian; Trntst.

Work done on liYUr's Real Estate-Liahiliiy.-Tlie plaintiff contracted orally with a husband to expend labor upon the real estate of
his wife, without mention as to whom the credit was to be given ; it
was done, in the husband's absence, under ihe care and to the satisfhetion of the wife; he did not deny his liability, but she did hers. file,
that they might be regarded as jointly liable. Verrill v. 'arker et vx.,
65 Me.
INJUNCTION.
See Set-off.
INSUnAN cE.
0onditions-Tariance b .Agent.-A policy of life insurance conditioncd upon the payment of a given premium upon a day certain, becomes void unless the premium is paid within the time named : Coombs
v. Charter Oak life ins. Co., 65 Me.
In an action upon a life insurance policy, the insured cannot introduce
evidence that the agent of the company before or at the time of the
negotiation of the insurance agreed to extend the time of payment of
premium beyond the time stated in the policy: L .
The plaintiff and wife procured a joint policy on their lives payable
to the survivor on the death of either, conditioned that if the semi-annual premium of $13.93 were not paid each six months from April 25th
1873, the policy should cease and determine. The payment of the premium due in October 1873 was not made or tendered till December following,. Beld, 1, the policy became void for non-payment of premium;
2, the plaintiff could not be allowed to introduce evidence "that at the
time this insurance was negotiated, the agent of the company assured
the plaintiff that he might pay down what money he had, and take the
policy, and that he would wait for the balance any time within the year,
and take care of him :" Id.
JUDG MENT.

Power of Attorney to Confess-Filling Blanks in Warrant.-Au attorney confessing judgment against a defendant may be called on to file
his warrant, and if it be entirely wanting in a power to appear and confess the judgment, the court to effectuate justice may strike off the judgment: i'ceesey v. Kitchen, 80 Penna.
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Setting aside a judgment is a matter of sound discretion on the facts,
and the refusal is not the subject of a writ of error: 1d.
A judgment was confessed by attorney on a note commencing, "I
promise to pay," &e., with warrant attached, having unfilled blanks,
and signed by defendant, viz.: "And - empower any attorney, &c.,
to appear for - and confess judgment against -," &c. Reil, that the
warrant was not void, and the attorney properly interpreted the blanks
to be intended to be filled with "me" : Id.
The note being that of defendant with warrant on the same paper,
the person was the same as the one named in the note, that is the defendant: Id.
In such case, if the interpretation of the blanks be unsound, the defendant will be left to his remedy against the attorney : Id.
LANDLORD AND TENANT.

Covenant for Anticipation of Rent.-A lease was for a store-room for
two years, for the yearly rent of $2000, with the stipulation that if the
lessee should, "at any time during the continuance of this lease attempt
to remove or manifest an intention to remove his goods and effects out
of or off the premises, without having paid * * * in full for all the
rent which shall become due during the term of this lease * * *, the
whole rent for the whole term shall be taken to be due * * * and the
(lessor) may proceed * * * to distrain and collect the whole as if by
the conditions of this lease the whole rent was payable in advance.'!
Reid, that by the lease it was not required that the attempt or intention
to remove the goods should be fraudulent in order to authorize a distress.
Goodwct v. Siharkey, 80 Penna.
The tenant becoming embarrassed sold and delivered goods to his
creditors in payment of debts to them and made an assignment for benefit
of creditors, Hiel, that the rent for the whole terni had become due
and the landlord might distrain : Rd
The tenant assented to the distress and within four months proceedings
in bankruptcy were commenced against him. Held not to be in fraud
of the Bankrupt Law: Id.
LEGACY.

An action at law will not lie for a legacy, against the administrator of an executor, where the latter has wasted, or converted to his
own use, the assets of his testator; the remedy is by a proceeding in
equity: Coates v. Xaccie, Admr., 43 Md.
LI'MITATIONS, STATUTE OF.
See Attorney; Partnership.
MARRIED WOMAN.

See Trust.

MASTER AND SERVANT.

Areglgecce-Defective Macknery.- The machinery and cars fur:
nished by railroad companies for use, ought not to be so unskilfully constructed that the slightest indiscretion on the part of the operatives
would prove fatal; and where they are so constructed, it is such negligence as will render them liable for damages occasioned thereby to an
employee who is ignorant of such unskilful constructicn : . 1V. & IV.
Railway Co. v. Fredericks,71 Ill.
MORT,

GE.

See

kaiftel .Afortyage.
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NUISANCE.

ee Damages.

Obstruction ftrcte-Ertct
of .ie icd..--Weln "a1vrecti,n itself
constitutes a nuisance as a building in a public street ob.truting its
safe passage, its removal or obstruction may be necessary thr Ilie abatement. of such nuisance: B'rghtmat v. lithabitants (!f Bristol. 65 Me.
When the nuisance consists in the wrongful
use of a building harmthe use : M.
less in itself, the remedy is to stop
When the act done or the thing complained of is only a nuisance by
reason of its location and not in and of itself, the couit will not order
the destruction of what constitutes the nuisance, but will require its
removal or cause its use, so far as such use is a nuisance, to cease : 1'd.
1owt abated.-The remedy for abating a public nuisance is by indictment and not by removing it by force, without legal proceedings finding
it to be a nuisance of that character; neither the coumonu law nor the
statute authorizes individuals to tear down and destroy buildings in
which an unlawful business is carried on, nor does either permit the
courts, on conviction, to have the buildings destroyed or abated, but the
offenders are subjcct to punishment : .Ea p v. Lee, 71 Ills.
OFFICER.

See Assunimist.

Authority of Officer deiacto.-Whcn ene of a board of officers is not
legally elected, but is an officer dc fiicto, he may legally joinl in the
action of tIme board with those who are officers ,cjare : Dalton v. Simmnons, 65 Me.
Thus the mayor and aldermen of Belfast were cx offlio overseers
of the poor; the city clerk who was not the mayor nor an alderman was
irregularly elected as an overseer, and chairman of the board, and joined
in the action of the board authorizing the supplies to the paupers, and
gave the written notices to the defendant town. 7eNl, 1. That the city
clerk legally joined in the action of the board, and might be counted as
one towards constituting a required majority; 2. That his notices to the
defendants, and their replies thereto, he having been known and recognised by them as an acting overseer, were legal and binding: M'.
PARTNERSHIP.

Promissory N'ote--8talute of Linmitatioms.-After a partnership was
dissolved, a note was given in the partnership name by one of two partners for a pre-existing partnership debt. In an action on the note
against the other partner, it was held: 1st. That if the debt was barred
by limitations at the time the note was given, the defendant would not
be liable upon the note, the same having been made without his knowledge or authority. 2d. That the admission or promise of tme partner
who signed the note, if made without the authority of the defendant,
though made within three years before the institution of the suit., could
not revive the right of action on the note against the defendant, or deprive him of his defence under the statute : .Xciwaman v. _lc(onmas, 43
Md.
Receiver-Effect of a Receiver's Sale of Debts he to a Reslnt
by .A-ou.rcsulcnt Debtors.-The Circuit Court of Baltimore
city in a case to which the .membcrs of an insolvent firm were parties,
appointed a receiver to take possession of the assets of the firm and
))arlershlt)
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collect the debts due it. By the authority of the court the receiver
sold all the assets -pidproperty, book debts, choses in action and effects
of the firm within the jurisdiction of the court, upon an offer of 1'. to
purchase the entire assets of the firm for a stated sum. The purchaser
under this sale collected debts due the firm by non-resident debtors,
claiming the same as his by virtue of said sale to him. On a bill for
an account of said collections, brought by members of the firm against
P., it was Held : 1st. That all the right and title of the firm to these
debts was virtually divested and passed to P. by the sale, with such power
to collect them as could be confbrred by the sale of the receiver or the
authority of the court. 2d. That if the debts were voluntarily paid, P.
was entitled to hold the proceeds without accounting therefor to the complainants. 3d. That if their payment was refused the court had the
power to compel the firm-being within its jurisdiction and parties to
the proceedings-to whom the debts were due, to assign and transfer all
their right and title thereto to P., so as to vest the same in him: Loney
v. Penninan,43 Md.
RAILROAD.

Failure to stop for Passengr-Damages.-Wherea railroad train
wrongfully fails to stop to take on a passenger, he is entitled to recover
nominal damages, and such actual damages as he may sustain by reason
of the delay, but he has no right to inflict injury on himself to enhance
the damages, as by walking to the next station, instead of waiting for the
next train, or procuring other conveyance, and thereby causing sickness:
J. B. & lK Railcay Co. v. Birney, 71 Ill.
RIPARIAN OWNER.

Alluvion.-Right of Owner to Build Wharf, &c.-Bythe common
law, where land lies adjacent or contiguous to a navigable river, in which
there is an ebb and flow of the tide, any increase of sbil formed by the
gradual and imperceptible recession of the water, or any gain by the
gradual and imperceptible formation of what is called alluvion, from the
action of the water washing it against the fast land of the shore, and
there becoming fixed as part of the land itself, belongs to the proprietor
of the adjacent or contiguous laud. And the right to accretion, thus
formed, is considered as an interest appurtenant to the principal land,
and belonging, in the nature of an incident, to the ownership of that,
rather than as something acquired by prescription or possession, in the
ordinary legal sense of those terms: Baltimore and Ohio Railroad 0o.
v.- Chase, 43 Md.
And in addition to this right by reliction or accretion, the riparian
proprietor, whose land i§ bounded by a navigable river, whether his title
extended beyond the dry land or not, has the right of access to the
navigable part of the river from the front of his lot, and the right to
make a landing, wharf or pier for his own use, or for the use of the
public, subject to such general rules and regulations'as.the legislature
may think proper to prescribe for the protection of the rights of the
public, whatever those rights may be. Id.
These riparian rights, founded on the common law, arc property, and
are valuable, and while they must be enjoyed in due subjection to the
rights of the public, they cannot be arbitrarily or capriciously destroyed
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or impaired. They are rights of which, when once vested, the owner
can only be deprived in accordance with the law ,I the land, and. if
necesssary that they be taken tbr public use, upon coimpensation : Ad
But these principles of the common law. governing the rights of the
riparian owner, are subject to change and modification by the statutc
law of the state, and by nature and circumstances of the grant by which
the title may have been acquired to the land bounding on the river : id.
SALE.

Implied Jtarranty-Rescissionz-Defendantgave plaintiffs, manufacturers of safes, a written order for a " No. 4 safe with combination hck,"
and plaintiffs sent a safe answerable to the order.
hl, that there was
no implied warranty as to the merits of the lock, but only that it should
be such as the order called for: Tilton Saof Co. v. Tisdale, 48 Vt.
When the right of rescission exists, it must be exercised within a reasonable time, or the property becomes the purchaser's, and he must pay
for it according to the contract, subject to the right to recoup such
damages as he has sustained by reason of the fraud of the vendor: Id.
SET-OFF.

Injury to Articles bought, occasioned by Vendor's Xeyliyence.-In an
action fbr the price of specific articles bargained and sold, but not delivered, defendant may set up, by way of a recoupment, any injury to such
articles occasioned by the fault or negligence of the vendor, subsequent
to the sale and prior to the time of delivery : Barrow v. Window, 71
Ill.
Insolvent Plaintiff-Equitey.-Tbe insolvency of a party seeking to
enforce his judgment, furnishes a sufficient ground for the interposition
of a court of equity to enable the debtor to avail himself of a set-off:
Marshallv. Cooper, 43 Md.
Injunction to restrain Execution ipon a Judgment-Inso'ency of
Greditor-Attorney's Lien for his Fee vpon a Judgment recovered for
his Client.-L., the creditor in a judgment, assigned the same to his wife,
who issued execution thereon. 'The judgment debtor filed a bill for an
injunction to restrain the execution on the ground that he had a claim
against L. which he was entitled to set-off against the judgment, and
alleging that he "is informed and verily believes that the said L. is
hopelessly insolvent, and was so at the time of said judgment." The
injunction issued as prayed. On a motion to dissolve the injunction
affidavits were filed by the complainant, stating that L. was indebted to
the affiants respectively, that he had been indebted for a long time, that
their efforts to make their money had been unavailing, that- he had no
assets whatever, that they had been informed that others of his creditors
had made fruitless efforts to collect their debts from him, and that he
was hopelessly insolvent; and they itated that he was insolvent, not
from infiormation derived from others, but from their own knowledge.
field, 1st. That whether the above allegation in the bill was an allegation of insolvency sufficient to warrant the court in issuing an injunction
in the first instance or not, it was certainly sufficient, when supplemented
by the proof before the court at the hearing of the motiou to dissolve,
to warrant the court in continuing it until final hearing.
2d. That L. being insolvent, the complainant had an undoubted right
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to go into equity and have his claim set-off against so much of the judgbent against hin as would be equal to his rightful claim against L.
3d. That the assignee of L stood in no better condition than he stood,
and was subject, to the same equitable rights which existed against him,
whether she was an assignee fbr a valuable consideration without notice
of the appellee's claim or otherwise.
4th. That the attorneys of L could not effectually assert a lien upon
the judgment for services rendered in obtaining it- -Levy v. Steinbach,
43 11d.
Charterof Affreightment-Liabilty of Chartererfor value of Vessel
destrol/ed bi Fire.-Wherea steamer, lying at the time at the wharf at
St. Louis, was taken into the service of the United States by a quartermaster of the United States, for a trip to different points on the Mississippi river, the compensation for the service required being stated at
the time to the captain, and no objection being made to the service or
compensation, and the service was rendered, the possession, command
and management of the steamer being retained by its owner: Held,
that the United States were charterers of the steamer upon a contract
of affreightment, and they were not liable under such a contract to the
owner for the value of the steamer, though she was destroyed by fire
whilst returning from the trip without his fault: Shaw v. the United
States, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1876.
SLANDER.

Failure to prove Just ffation.-It is error to instruct the jury in an
action for slander, that the delenee of justification is odious when not
sustained by the evidence, and such an instruction cannot but influence
the jury against the defendant: Corbley v. Wilson, 71 Ill.
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.

When it will not be Decreed.-Where the contract sought to be enforced is alleged to be one by which the defendant was to take a lease
of land, and the proof shows that she contracted for the fee and for no
other estate in the property, and authorized no other person to make a
different contract for her, the court will not compel her to accept a lease
instead of a deed in fee, or give the complainant compensation for the
non-performance of the contract: .Ellicott v. White, 43 Md.
Where there is a substantial defect with respect to the nature, character, situation, extent or quality of the estate, which is unknown to
the vendee, and in regard to which he is not put upon inquiry, a specific
performance will not be decreed : .d.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.

Jurisdiction-Amountin Controversy.-A fund being in court for distribution among the creditors of an insolvent bank, a claim by A. to the
amount of $6000 was allowed. To this B., another claimant, excepted,
and the exception being overruled B. appealed to this court. It appearing that if the claim of A. were disallowed the amount of additional
dividend that would come to B. would be less than $2000, the appeal was
dismissed : Terry v. Bank of Commerce, S C. U. S. Oct. Term 1876.
TIME.

See Covenant.

-
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TRESPASS.

See Darmaycs.

TRUST. See Gu'ardlan.
,&ep(arate use ofilb-ri'd llman.-A testator gave.to a daughter onethird of the residue of his estate, " for her sole and separate ise. and
so that her husband shall not have any control over or use of the sanie.
her heirs and assigns for ever." The husband being alive, eld, that
this created a trust to preserve the estate for her separate use. so that
its control could not be exercised by the husband : Tlarner's Appeal, 80
Penna.

No trustee being named in the will, equity would raise a trustee. to
effectuate the testator's intention : I.
In distributing the estate it was the duty of the Orphans' Court to
preserve the use by ordering that the fund should not be paid to the
legatee, thereby enabling her to dispose of it contrary to the trust: I .
Col ensation.-A trustee can make no profit out of his office, for
the reason that he shall not be placed in any position where his interest
may be opposed to his duty. And this rule that one occupying the
position of trustee can have no allowance or compensation for his time
and trouble in the execution of the trust, applies not only to trustees,
strictly so called, but to all who hold a fiduciary relation, as executors,
administrators, mortgagcees, receivers, guardians and officers, directors
and trustees of corporations : tozugh v. larrey,71 Ill.
Vegligence in selecting Insurance-Where a deed of trust gives the
trustee full power to select the company or companies in which to insure
the trust property, he will be required to exercise due care in the selection of good and solvent companies, but he will not be a guarantor of
their solvency : Gettins v. Scudder, 71 Ill.
WATERS AND

WATERCOURSES.

See Riparian Owner.

Riparian Owner--Extent of Title-Alluvion.-In the location of a
body of land for the benefit of soldiers the Commonwealth reserved
'000 acres on the east and north of the Ohio and Allegheny rivers, and
directed it to be laid out in lots for a town (afterwards Allegheny City);
some of the lots abutted on the north side of a street called Bank lane,
'"
as it runs by the courses of the river :" HIel, that the title of the
lot-owners to the soil did not cross the street to the river : Allegheny
C0'tY v. Moorehead, 80 Penna.
The interest of the lot-owners south of the north line of the street
was but an easement in common with all others in the use of b,-street,
which was bounded by the water line: i.
The water highway began at the water line and the public right was
such only as could be claimed by all for navigation and other purposes:
Id.
The street was widened by deposits by the owners of the lots and the
city and was widened by the city to a defined width ; this was not an
accretion by gradual deposits or an enlargement by dereliction of the
water: Id.
The channel between the island and Allegheny City became so filled
as to be useless as a highway, unless in high water; the land lying
between the natural low-water line of the island and Bank lane belonged
to the Commonwealth: Id.

